THE SWEETHEART DEALS

On 6th July 1898 Sir Alfred Milner, British Governor at the Cape, wrote to Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain. In part ,it read, I look on Delagoa Bay as the best chance we have of winning the great game between ourselves and the Transvaal for the mastery of South Africa without a war. I am not indeed sure we shall ever be masters without a war.

Milner goes on to say the war can only be avoided if Rhodesia developed rapidly to rival the ZAR (doubtful) but that wealth and opportunity were on the side of the Transvaal and that short of bringing “effective pressure” on that country it would “turn the scale against us.”

Milner considered that Delagoa Bay, in Portuguese territory was the most important trade route and by the end of 1898 Britain had successfully completed campaigns in Sudan and India and was engaged in sealing off Delagoa Bay, the last non-British trade outlet available to Kruger’s volk.

The tide had turned dramatically and there would be no help coming from the Kaiser. The German monarch had once said, “come what may, I shall never allow the British to stamp out the Transvaal.” If Kruger ever suffered under the illusion of gaining assistance from that quarter then he should have instead heeded the earlier words of Lord Palmerston, (a notable Whig PM): ‘ there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests.’

Germany had to be won over before British aggression in South Africa could succeed. By the end of August 1898 the British and Germans had resolved not to lend money to Portugal independently. Secret protocols stated that should Portugal ever have to relinquish her colonies then Germany would take the northern part of Mozambique and Britain the part with Delagoa Bay, as part of the division of spoils.
Germany had also backed Britain against France and Russia, elsewhere, and of course the Kaiser was aware of the strength of the Royal Navy as he had overseas colonies to be concerned about.

In addition, more direct negotiations were being held with Portugal, in blocking the ZAR access to the sea, conducted by the British ambassador in Portugal,Sir Hugh MacDonald, from July 1899 onwards.

A secret treaty with the Portuguese promised to defend and protect all conquests or colonies of Portugal against enemies future and present.

This was kept secret from Germany and on 5 January 1900, the PM, Lord Salisbury, denied to the Germans that anything of importance had taken place with Portugal.

As McCord notes: ‘But the fact was that Britain had secured German and Portuguese co-operation against the Transvaal by opposite promises to the same Portuguese territory’….(see South African Struggle p247).

The sweetheart deals were the ultimate examples of the cynicism of British High Imperialist foreign policy,under Salisbury’s regime, but they certainly gave positive prove to Palmerston’s words.