Reflections on CF Beyers….and some others

The last Boer outpost to fly the flag of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republic,the Vierkleur, was Pietersburg, in the Zoutpansberg area (northern Transvaal).

The Boers in this region,from September 1900 were under the command of Christiaan Frederik Beyers, appointed by the acting president, Schalk Burger who had replaced the legendary Paul Kruger after the old leader went into exile.

In his 500 page , Breaker Morant (2020), the Australian author, Peter FitzSimons describes the 32 year old Beyers as a lawyer, passionate leader with a religious bent, possessing charm, guile and demonstrable fearlessness and able to sense British weakness.

By June 1901 , as the Bushveldt Carbineers (BVC) arrived in the region, Beyers decamped from the Sweetwaters Farm and Hotel some 70 miles north of Pietersburg rather than cause problems for the owners, Charlie and Olivia Bristow, an English-Afrikaner couple.

In fact, Captain Alfred ‘Bulala’ Taylor, acting Native Commissioner, took over Beyers old room as he accompanied the OIC, Captain James Robertson, to the remote region in an attempt to dampen Boer activity.

By early December 1910 the BVC was dishonoured, dismembered and dissolved after their murderous activities in the region -and Beyers was back in his old room at the Sweetwaters Farm.

In fact, during the trial of Morant,Handcock and Witton, Beyers led a raid on Pietersburg and the three prisoners were issued with arms to help fight off the attack!

Just two days earlier Beyers and his men had taken over a Burgher camp, just outside of Pietersburg with little resistance from British guards. Boer women had distracted them while Beyers pounced, making off with 150 prisoners, food and drink, while releasing their British prisoners.

The Pietersburg Light Horse replaced the disgraced Carbineers with few of original BVC members in its ranks, and sadly the grisly story of this remote region was a reflection of matters spiralling out of control elsewhere, notably the concentration camps.

Ironically, at this stage the Cape Governor and High Commissioner for Southern Africa, Milner, wrote to the Governor of Bechuanaland (Goold-Adams) saying, ‘no matter how blameless we may be in the matter, we shall not be able to make anybody think so,’ and that ‘there must be some way to make things a little less awfully bad if one could only think of it.’ (Yes, if only one could…..on all fronts, including preventing future historians from blaming one for starting the war!).

After the war, with the coming of responsible government for the Transvaal, Beyers became the Speaker of the House and his astuteness, impartiality and tolerance impressed English speaking South Africans.

He would have been supported by all sides for the same job at Union (1910) but was instead given command of the Union Defence Force, after two years as an MP – a fitting enough appointment as one of the main Transvaal military leaders of the war.

Unfortunately, with the commencement of WW1, Beyers like many Afrikaners disapproved of the Botha Government’s plan to attack German South West Africa.

Beyers was a bit like a Union officer in the USA, called Robert E. Lee, who became far better known as Confederate Commander-in-Chief, in the American Civil War (1861-5). Like Lee, Beyers resigned his commission to join the rebels.

His resignation was handed to the Deputy PM and Defence Minister, Jan Smuts, and demonstrated the difficulties for Botha and Smuts towards those who would follow Beyers with similar thoughts, notably, JBM (Barry) Hertzog.

Smuts, accepting the resignation, replied to the former Commandant General that this war commitment to the British was a test of the Union’s pledge of loyalty.It would not be the last time that a global war sowed divisions within Afrikanerdom-   with Smuts ultimately becoming PM,for the second time, precisely because of WW2.

None of this would worry Beyers because he drowned, forging the Vaal River, while trying to avoid the Union troops he once led, early in the conflict (8.12.14)-but not before becoming a controversial figure. 

Two ‘Verraaiers’

Because he departed the scene in 1914 it is perhaps forgotten that Beyers faced some of the same criticisms, that ‘Slim Jannie’ (Jan Smuts), was unable to avoid in his long career.

Put simply, both these courageous Boer generals would be labelled as verraaiers (traitors) by significant swathes of the population – from Afrikaners, in the case of Smuts, and by English speakers, in the case of Beyers.

Louis Grundlingh (Historia,  vol 59, n2, 2014) recaptures some of the spirit of the times, after the resignation of Beyers on 15^th September 2014, a month after the Great War started.

English speakers were outraged. Judge Graham wrote to the Chief Justice Rose-Innes saying that “I thought Beyers was too educated to play the traitor in this fashion.” But did he?

Certainly the English press piled on. Beyers had been lauded two weeks earlier by the Cape Argus after he had said it was a soldier’s duty to carry out orders irrespective of whether he agreed with them. True enough while in uniform but Beyers resigned at what he thought was an unlawful act,arguing the Germans had not attacked SA. The Friend regarded that as sophistry, saying he was “trimming his sails to the wind.”

However, Jan Kemp was another, to resign his Union commission, so notably both of these Boer generals had the sense not to do as Jopie Fourie did. Fourie stayed in Union uniform, opening fire at soldiers in his own ranks,killing some.

In contrast it appears, as noted by PJ Strauss, military historian, that Beyers did not expend any ammunition on his pursuers before wading into the Vaal River, and his doom, while attempting escape (‘General Beyers World View,’ in Journal of Humanities, vol 60 n3, Sep.2020).

There was only one way the Rebellion could have ended with some 32,000 Union troops (two thirds of them Afrikaners) opposed to 12, 000 rebels of which over 7000 came from the northern Orange Free State. Little wonder then that in the second Union election the nascent National Party, under Barry Hertzog, had a huge triumph in the OFS winning either all, or at least 16 of their 17 seats, (sources differ). 

Thus we see in the two Boer generals, Smuts and Beyers, just how significant the Anglo-Boer War was in the fracturing of South African society-at the start of the rebellion and in the future.

Indeed the former SAP minister, Barry Hertzog, now the newly minted National Party Opposition leader, (from January 1914), opposed the Union government intentions to attack German SWA as being ‘against the interests of South Africa and the Empire.’ As a contrast, in the 1914 Australian Federal election the Opposition Labor leader, Andrew Fisher, pledged to “fight to the last man and the last shilling” for the mother country. (PM Cook’s Liberals were similarly disposed but it was Labor that won the election to make Fisher PM for the third time).There in a nutshell was the difference between a cohesive country in contrast with one where there was an English speaking minority, indeed where the majority had been stripped of their independent countries. Such a history did not make for South African unity. 

Given, that from 1924-39 the National Party became the dominant party (in coalition or fusion), Beyers no doubt could have been a major player again if he had survived the Rebellion.

The start of the Great War was devastating for some of the military leaders of the volk. Beyers had been with Senator Koos de La Rey when a police bullet ended the life of that former great general, at a road block set up looking for a criminal gang; another giant from the ABW the Orange Pimpernel-Christiaan de Wet- was finally run to ground by Commandant Jorrie Jordaan (under Colonel Brits’ command), something the British failed to do in the ABW.  

Also MT Steyn, the courageous last president of the OFS, died in late November 1916 and Botha passed in August 1919-both deceased well ahead of their time, caused by the stress of wars.

Thus the Great War era was another devastating period and the losses of these significant figures only further poisoned-Anglo-Afrikaner relations, making the task of the conciliators more difficult.

Beyers and his wife Mathilde were both committed Christians, with the General being a good friend of JD du Toit-the poet, Totius- another devout Afrikaner and nationalist.

 

 

THE SWEETHEART DEALS

On 6th July 1898 Sir Alfred Milner, British Governor at the Cape, wrote to Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain. In part ,it read, I look on Delagoa Bay as the best chance we have of winning the great game between ourselves and the Transvaal for the mastery of South Africa without a war. I am not indeed sure we shall ever be masters without a war.

Milner goes on to say the war can only be avoided if Rhodesia developed rapidly to rival the ZAR (doubtful) but that wealth and opportunity were on the side of the Transvaal and that short of bringing “effective pressure” on that country it would “turn the scale against us.”

Milner considered that Delagoa Bay, in Portuguese territory was the most important trade route and by the end of 1898 Britain had successfully completed campaigns in Sudan and India and was engaged in sealing off Delagoa Bay, the last non-British trade outlet available to Kruger’s volk.

The tide had turned dramatically and there would be no help coming from the Kaiser. The German monarch had once said, “come what may, I shall never allow the British to stamp out the Transvaal.” If Kruger ever suffered under the illusion of gaining assistance from that quarter then he should have instead heeded the earlier words of Lord Palmerston, (a notable Whig PM): ‘ there are no permanent friends, only permanent interests.’

Germany had to be won over before British aggression in South Africa could succeed. By the end of August 1898 the British and Germans had resolved not to lend money to Portugal independently. Secret protocols stated that should Portugal ever have to relinquish her colonies then Germany would take the northern part of Mozambique and Britain the part with Delagoa Bay, as part of the division of spoils.
Germany had also backed Britain against France and Russia, elsewhere, and of course the Kaiser was aware of the strength of the Royal Navy as he had overseas colonies to be concerned about.

In addition, more direct negotiations were being held with Portugal, in blocking the ZAR access to the sea, conducted by the British ambassador in Portugal,Sir Hugh MacDonald, from July 1899 onwards.

A secret treaty with the Portuguese promised to defend and protect all conquests or colonies of Portugal against enemies future and present.

This was kept secret from Germany and on 5 January 1900, the PM, Lord Salisbury, denied to the Germans that anything of importance had taken place with Portugal.

As McCord notes: ‘But the fact was that Britain had secured German and Portuguese co-operation against the Transvaal by opposite promises to the same Portuguese territory’….(see South African Struggle p247).

The sweetheart deals were the ultimate examples of the cynicism of British High Imperialist foreign policy,under Salisbury’s regime, but they certainly gave positive prove to Palmerston’s words.

 

THE BUTLER WHO SAW THROUGH MILNER

General Sir William Butler proved in his short period in South Africa that he was the right man for the job. Unfortunately the man who stayed, Sir Alfred Milner, was the wrong man for his job and the Anglo-Boer war was the consequence and remains the dreadful epitaph of the latter.

There is probably no better example of a hawk and a dove co-existing together, supposedly on the same side but in reality poles apart.

Butler accepted the position of Commander-in-Chief of British forces in South Africa after the death of his predecessor General Goodenough. Butler arrived at the Cape in December 1898 and on the 17^th of that month,just two weeks into his term, he gave a speech at Grahamstown, that immediately separated his position from Milner.

 Milner who had arrived in May 1897, to be the Governor and High Commissioner at the Cape, had no empathy for the Boers and after the ZAR President Kruger’s re-election, in February 1898, wrote to his minister, Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain thus: ‘There is no way out of the political troubles of South Africa except reform in the Transvaal or war. And at present chances of reform…..are worse than ever.’

In contrast Butler’s as not only CIC (but initially as Acting High Commissioner, for three months, (while Milner was on leave in London) said, “South Africa….does not need a surgical operation, she needs peace, progress and the development which is only possible through the union of many hearts and the labour of many hands.”

The PM at the Cape, William Schreiner, instinctively recognized Butler as a man of peace.

The Uitlanders and their organization the SA League, hated him, even more so a little later when he refused to forward their petition to the Queen, protesting the release of a ZARP( a Boer policeman) who had shot an Englishman,Thomas Edgar, during an arrest.

The SA League built this up into a huge poltical circus as an example of the unfairness and bias of the evil Boer. It was nothing of the sort. Edgar had bashed another English speaking man senseless who died a few days later. During his arrest Edgar had struck the police officer twice with a rod and was subsequently shot dead in the scuffle. The SA League demanded that a petition be sent to the Queen but Butler refused, instead reminding home officials of the machinations of the League. Butler described the Uitlanders as ‘probably the most corrupt immoral and untruthful assemblage of beings at present in the world.’

Butler, himself an Irish Catholic, did not want a second Ireland to plague the English to all eternity and he believed intermarriages would ultimately fuse the two white tribes together.

In February 1899 Milner returned to his HC desk and duties, at the Cape. His meeting with Butler was chilly. They clearly disagreed over the Edgar case and Butler’s fair and exhaustively documented report. During their conversation, Butler commented that the only thing he envied about Milner was his library! (Matched only, one could add, by Milner’s vast lack of knowledge on South Africa).

For Milner, the General’s views were totally unacceptable and he set about forcing a confrontation with the Transvaal and President Kruger’s ZAR government.

Again encouraged the Uitlanders drew up a second petition that suited Milner perfectly and he transmitted it to Chamberlain, insisting on immediate action.

Milner followed with his inflammatory ‘Helots telegram’ likening the plight of British subjects to slaves on the mining fields with their lack of voting rights.

Milner had clearly wanted a military man who was eager to be a confidant in preparing for a clash with Afrikanerdom. Instead he got a man implacably opposed to fueling a war.

Butler carried out his instructions from the War Office correctly, by examining  British defence preparedness in their two SA colonies. Part of his instructions he regarded as absurd. He was told that if war broke out he was to push his weak forces into Boer territory. This was a recipe for capture or annihilation and given what happened later to British generals- in Black Week (Dec 10-17,1899), at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso)- it showed that Butler had a better grasp of reality than the theorists back home.

Butler had recommended a strictly defensive policy and as he had published a biography on  General Colley , who had died at Majuba in 1881, he had no wish to repeat the disaster of that general of the first ABW-a short skirmish won by the Boers.

Butler was under no illusions of the enormity of the task to quell the Boers and even Milner would later concede that ‘his merit was that he knew the size of the job.’

Butler also, rightly, opposed the sending of anymore troops to South Africa because he knew that would signal British warlike intentions to the Boers –and the failure to heed his words ultimately did just that.

Eventually, a communiqué from the War Office asked him about army supplies and to authorize a number of mules to transport army supplies. It concluded by asking him for any observations he wished to offer. He replied, that a war would be the greatest calamity that ever occurred in South Africa…..advice unpalatable to the ruling elite, particularly Milner.

Milner’s next ‘trick’ was to try and get his CIC to assist an adventurer, by the names of Wools-Sampson, a trigger happy Briton, who wanted to raise an irregular horse regiment to help police the borders of the Cape and Natal. Butler agreed to see him, at Milner’s request, but correctly informed him that he had received no instructions from the War Office to do any such thing, as he requested. He knew that Wools-Sampson had fought the Boers in 1881 and had wanted to do so again during the Jameson Raid.

 Butler gave a dispassionate account of the meeting but one eye witness reported furious outbursts on both sides with Wools-Sampson accusing the CIC of being a “traitor” and General Butler responding, calling him a “lunatic.”

Milner,of course, wrote home saying the situation was untenable- it had to be him or Butler and as usual the wrong choice was made. Butler officially tendered his resignation on 4^th July 1899 and received a reply, by cable on 9^th August, agreeing to it.

To PM Schreiner the General wote, ‘Try and remember me as one who did his best, according to his lights, for South Africa and her peoples.’ He had.

His successor as CIC at the Cape, General Forrestier-Walker, arrived on 6^th September 1899 and soon wrote he could not improve on Sir William Butler’s sound defence plans.

The failure of those officers early in the ABW was because they used Butler’s defensive plans for offensive measures with disastrous consequences.

So Milner’s War, instead of Butler’s Peace, led to the most brutal war for a century- between the Napoleonic era and the Great War- and was the source of great bitterness between Afrikaner and Briton that is not fully erased, even today.